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IN THE SUPREME COURT OF THE 
STATE OF UTAH 
STATE OF UTAH, 
Plaintiff and Respondent, 
vs. No. 12,091 
JOHN CHARLES WILKS, 
Defendant and Appellant 
BRIEF OF APPELLANT 
Appeal from a verdict of Guilty to a charge of Assault 
With Intent to Commit Murder With a Revolver, and from 
the judgment and sentence imposed thereupon by the Honor-
able Maurice Harding, District Judge of the Fourth Judicial 
District of the State of Utah, in and for Utah County. 
The appellant will hereinafter be ref erred to as the De-
fendant and the plaintiff and respondent will be referred to 
as the State. 
STATEMENT OF FACTS 
Defendant, John Charles Wilks, was charged in the Fourth 
District Court in and for Utah County, State of Utah, with the 
crime of assault with intent to commit murder with a revolver, 
allegedly committed on September 2, 1969, in Utah County, 
Utah, as follows, to-wit: 
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"Richard L. Maxfield, District Attorney for the Fourth 
Judicial District of the State of Utah, accuses John Charles 
Wilks of the crime of assault with intent to commit murder 
and charges that on or about the 2nd day of September, 1969, 
at Utah County, State of Utah, the said John Charles Wilks 
did assault Charles Waren with a revolver with intent to com-
mit murder." (See information) To the charge contained in 
the information, the Defendant entered a plea of "Not Guilty", 
and the case was set to be tried before a jury on February 4 
and 5, 1970. The trial was held in Salt Lake City, Utah, at the 
request of the Defendant in an attempt to obtain a more im-
partial jury, which said request was approved by the Court. 
At the conclusion of the trial the jury returned a verdict as to 
the Defendant of "Guilty of Assault With Intent to Commit 
Murder", (Tr. 141). On February 5, 1970, immediately after 
the conclusion of the trial and the rendering of the verdict to 
the jury, the Defendant waived any time for the pronouncing 
of the judgment (Tr. 142). Whereupon, the Judge sentenced 
the Defendant to confinement in the Utah State Prison for an 
indeterminate term of not less than 5 years nor more than 
life. (Tr. 143). 
Upon the trial of the case the State called as witnesses 
Richard Floyd Duke, a Springville police officer (Tr. 7), Clair 
Rasmussen, highway patrolman (Tr. 27), Dr. Chester B. 
Powell (Tr. 33), Mr. Mack Holley, Utah County Sheriff 
Deputy (Tr. 102), Mr. Nelson S. Evans, highway patrolman 
(Tr. 128), and Mr. Roy Helm, Assistant Superintendent of 
Utah Highway Patrol (Tr. 131). The Defendant called as 
witnesses Rudolph Lopez Moreno by reading i.nto the record 
the transcript of the hearing called for the purpose of taking 
said testimony (Tr. 57), and the Defendant, John Charles 
Wilks (Tr. 74). 
2 
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From the evidence introduced it appears without sub-
stantial conflict that duri.ng the day of September 2, 1969, 
Defendant, John Charles Wilks, was driving a vehicle north 
on the freeway toward Springville, Utah County, Utah, with 
Rudolph Lopez Moreno as a passenger in the front right seat 
of the car at a time when there was a .22 caliber pistol and a 
kni.fe on the front seat between the driver and the passenger. 
(Tr. 59) The gun had been in the possession of both the De-
fendant and the passenger Moreno. (Tr. 60) Defendant and 
his passenger discovered that they were being followed by a 
highway patrol car, and they turned off the freeway toward 
Springville, Utah, on the street known as 400 South Street, 
they being aware that the patrol car had followed them ap-
proximately three miles. (Tr. 69) When the Defendant dis-
covered that the patrol car was following him off the freeway, 
he pulled the car over to the si.de of the road as he was pro-
ceeding east on 400 South in such a position as to have the two 
right wheels of the car Defendant was driving off the paved 
portion of the highway, with a patrol car being driven by 
Officer Charles Warren stopping behi.nd the Defendant's car 
a distance of approximately 15 or 16 feet. Officer Duke, the 
Springville policeman, proceeded by radio call on 400 South 
Street toward the Defendant's car, crossed over and stopped 
in front of the Defendant's vehicle a distance of approximately 
12 to 15 feet by adding the length of the front of the car driven 
by Officer Duke to the driver's seat, (Tr. 13) and at a time 
when the Defendant's car had completely stopped. (Tr.11) 
Officer Duke was carrying a .357 Colt Magnum Pistol. (Tr. 
11). Officer Warren, from his car parked behind Defendant's 
car, got out of the patrol car a distance of approximately 2 
to 3 feet from the left side of his car toward the paved portion 
of the street. Officer Warren cautiously approached Defend-
ant's vehicle, raised his right hand to his sip and unsnapped 
3 
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his gun and placed his right hand on the butt of his gun, 
motioning Defendant to come toward Officer Warren with 
Officer Warren's left hand at a time when Officer Duke 
thought Officer Warren was motioning for Officer Duke to 
proceed and come forward. (Tr. 12) The pistol in the car of 
the Defendant was a .22 caliber single shot pistol. (See De-
fendant's Exhibit IV). 
At this point the testimony is in conflict. Officer Duke 
at the time of the trial testified that he stopped 8 to 10 feet 
in front of suspect's vehicle; (Tr. 10, line 24) that Defendant's 
car was stopped in such a position that the right wheels were 
just off the paved portion of the road; (Tr. 10, line 28) that 
Officer Warren was approximately 2 to 3 feet away from his 
left front door toward the center of the road when he mo-
tioned for the Defendant to come out of the car; (Tr. 11, line 
19) that as Defendant leaned out of his car, two shots rang 
out, Officer Warren was failing with his gun still holstered ; 
(Tr. 13, line 18) that Officer Duke was standing behind his 
left front door when he heard the shots ring out, unholstered 
his gun and fired one shot at the Defendant; (Tr. 14) that 
Defendant returned Officer Duke's fire and then Officer 
Duke in turn returned three more shots at the Defendant, 
after which ti.me Defendant jumped from his car on the left 
side and ran away from Officer Duke and between the De-
fendant's car and Trooper Warren's vehicle and out into a 
field; (Tr. 14) Officer Duke, after Defendant had run into 
the field, saw Officer Warren wi.pe his forehead with his 
handkerchief. (Tr. 16) Officer Duke did not see the .22 
caliber single shot pistol in Defendant's hand at any time. 
(Tr. 19) Officer Duke testified that the first two shots were 
one ri.ght on top of the other. (Tr. 19) Officer Duke testified 
that one of his shots ricocheted off the left front door of 
Defendant's car and one ricocheted off the hood of Defendant's 
4 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library. 
Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
car into the windshield. (Tr. 20) Officer Duke stated that 
when he saw Officer Warren in the road, Officer Warren's 
head was 15 feet to 18 feet from the left front door of Defend-
ant's car, and that Officer Warren was from 7 to 8 feet from 
Defendant when the first two shots were fired. (Tr. 26, 27) 
After the first shot was fired by Officer Duke, Warren had 
dropped out of Officer Duke's sight. (Tr. 23) 
Officer Rasmussen testified that as he approached the 
scene from a distance of tbout two blocks, he saw Officer 
Warren standing at the left of his vehicle. (Tr. 28) Officer 
Rasmussen was driving at a hi.gh rate of speed at the time he 
first saw Officer Warren standing to the left of his car with 
Warren's hands on his hips and his right hand being near 
his weapon; that he saw Officer Warren go down at a time 
when he heard only one shot, and Officer Warren did not 
draw his revolver. (Tr. 29) Officer Rasmussen stopped his 
car behind Trooper Warren's and fired three times at the 
Defendant running into an open field. (Tr. 30) 
Dr. Chester B. Powell testified upon examining Officer 
Warren in Salt Lake City that he found two circular wounds 
approximately % of an inch apart on the right forehead to-
ward the temple, appeared to be bullet wounds and wounds of 
entry, and he found no wounds of exit. (Tr. 35) Dr. Powell 
performed surgery on the head of Officer Warren, and with 
the suction tube removed a blood hemorrhage plus a number 
of small bullet fragments. (Tr. 37) Dr. Powell further testi-
fied that the two holes in Officer Warren's head were ap-
proximately 1/i of an inch in diameter, about %. of an inch 
apart, and they looked to Dr. Powell like they might have 
been made by a .32 sized bullet. (Tr. 38) At Tr. 39, the 
District Attorney asked Dr. Powell as follows: 
Line 8, Page 39 : "Doctor, previous testimony has 
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indicated that Trooper Warren took his handkerchief 
from his pocket and wiped his forehead and put his 
handkerchief back into his pocket after this injury. 
Is that possible? Is that something normal with an 
injury of this type?" 
Answer: "Yes. It would have been possible. But it 
would have had to occurred within 20 or 30 seconds 
from the injury. After that, I don't think he would 
have been conscious or able to have done any volun-
tary movement." 
Line 17, Page 39: "Do you have an opinion as to 
whether his condition at that time would have al-
lowed him to have fired his gun?" 
Answer: "Not unless he had fired it before he had 
sustained the gunshot wound himself." 
Dr. Powell testified that the bullet fragments removed 
from the head of Officer Warren were not large enough to 
identify the size of the bullet that had been fired, and that 
the little fragments were about 1/16 of an inch in diameter. 
(Tr. 41) The District Attorney asked Dr. Powell whether 
or not Officer Warren could now remember the events of the 
shooting. Dr. Powell testified that Officer Warren was "un-
able to recollect any events when I have asked him, and I 
would not expect his to have recollected the circ,umstances." 
(Tr. 43) After Dr. Powell had testified as to the nature and 
extend of the injuries of Officer Warren and over the strenu-
ous objection of Defendant's counsel which was made off the 
transcript record and between the Court and all counsel but 
which is made a part of the record under Defendant's motion 
for new trial, Trooper Warren was permitted to be brought 
into the courtroom sitting in a wheelchair. (Tr. 44) Dr. 
Powell then proceeded to demonstrate on the head of Officer 
Warren sitting i.n the wheelchair the general area where 
th holes occurred, but were not visible to anyone in the court-
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room and to which Officer Warren could not and did not make 
any response. (Tr. 44) Dr. Powell testified over the strenu-
ous objection of Defendant's counsel of lack of foundation for 
the testimony, and no evidence of measurements of the cal-
culation that the bullets retained in the head of Officer War-
ren could either be a .22 deformed or a .32, but that he did 
not think it would be larger than a .32. (Tr. 46) On cross-
examination Dr. Powell testified that when bullets strike a 
skull very strange things happen, that they become distended, 
might explode, break in two, that it is possible for one bullet 
that is split in two to make the two holes in the head of Of. 
ficer Warren, and that there was no way of determining 
whether there was more than one bullet track through the 
brain of Officer Warren. (Tr. 47) Dr. Powell further testi-
fied on cross-exami.nation that the X-rays taken were not 
specifically to determine the size of the object that still re-
mained in the head of Officer Warren. (Tr. 48) 
After the testimony of Dr. Powell the State rested. At 
that time defense counsel made a motion out of the presence 
of the jury for the Court to direct a verdict in favor of the 
Defendant. This was at a time when the Defendant's gun 
had not been offered into evidence and that the only evidence 
was that the Defendant was seen running from the scene 
with the gun in his hand. (Tr. 51, 52) The Court denied the 
motion. Defendant's counsel requested after the deni.al of 
the motion that the State produce Officer Warren's gun for 
the Defendant's case and that Defendant would put on testi-
mony to the effect that Officer Warren's gun had, in fact, 
been fired more than once. The Court did not rule upon 
Defendant counsel's request for the production of Warren's 
gun. (Tr. 53, 54). 
At the commencement of the Defendant's case, Moreno, 
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through his deposition, testified that after Wilks had stopped 
the car, Moreno heard vVarren request Wilks to get out of 
the car and motioned Wilks with his hand to come out; that 
Officer Warren unleashed his holster with Warren's right 
hand. (Tr. 61). Moreno testified that Moreno then gave 
Wilks the .22 caliber pistol telling Wilks that the officer was 
probably after the gun, handed Wilks the gun, Wilks took it 
with his right hand, opened the car door, heard Wilks say 
"don't" or "don't shoot" or "don't, wait," and then heard shots 
fired. (Tr. 62). Moreno testified that he could not see who 
was shooting, but that it was not Wilks that fired the first 
shot because he could tell if the shot was coming from inside 
the car. (Tr. 663). Moreno testified that the gun was cocked 
when he handed it to Wilks, and that Moreno had shot the 
pistol along the hi.ghway from the car as they proceeded north 
and before the shooting of Officer Warren in question. (Tr. 
64). Moreno testified that a bullet missed him from the back. 
(Tr. 66). 
Defendant Wilks took the stand on his own behalf and 
testified that Officer Warren's car was 8 to 10 feet behi.nd 
the rear of Defendant's car. (Tr. 79). That Springville of-
ficer's car was approximately 6 to 8 feet in front of the front 
of Defendant's car. (Tr. 81). That as Wilks started to stand 
up in getting out of the car, Warren went for his gun, pulled 
his gun, and shot at Wilks whi.le Warren was in a crouch. 
(Tr. 81, 82, 83). Wilks testified that one shot was fired and 
he was struck by it in the hand. (Tr. 83). That Wilks' gun 
did not intentionally go off, and that after Warren had shot 
once, Wilks' gun discharged once. (Tr. 85). Wilks testified 
that the one shot from his gun that was fired was fired as 
he was falling back into the car, and that Wilks' gun dis-
charged almost immediately or just a couple of seconds after 
Officer Warren had shot. (Tr. 88). Wilks identified State's 
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Exhibit IV as being the same type of gun that he had, a .22 
caliber pistol, and demonstrated before the Court that to fire 
Exhibit IV you had to manually pull back the hammer with 
your thumb to cock the gun. (Tr. 88, 89). Wilks testified 
that there were three and no more than four unspent car-
tridges in the .22 caliber pistol at the time that he had it in 
his hand when he got out of the car. (Tr. 90). Wilks testified 
that Officer Warren was approximately 12 to 15 feet from 
Wilks when Warren fired at Wilks. (Tr. 93). Wilks testified 
that he took the gun out of the car with him to give it to 
Officer Warren, and that Wilks did not aim the gun at Officer 
Warren or anyone else. (Tr. 92). 
After Defendant had rested, State called Officer Holley 
in rebuttal. Officer Holley identified a mark on the left front 
door of the Defendant's car as illustrated in Exhibit VI that a 
bullet had apparently glanced off the door into the ai.r which 
had been fired from in front of Defendant's car. (Tr. 106). 
A photograph entered as State's Exhibit XIII was examined 
by Officer Holley and testified that there was one hole in the 
windshield of Defendant's car and testified that he examined 
and found three entrance holes into the windshield and two 
exit holes. (Tr. 109). Officer Holley testified that two shots 
entered the Defendant's car from the rear of the Defendant's 
car. (Tr. 111). Officer Holley testified from Exhibits IX 
and XI that he found two bullets that had been fired into 
the back of the Defendant's car. (Tr. 111). Officer Holley 
testified as to evidence of a split slug, and that a shot that 
entered the Defendant's car from the rear was fired in a 
line that Warren would have been i.n at the time. (Tr. 112). 
Holley testified that a bullet fired from behind was a .38 
caliber bullet. (Tr. 115). Holley further testified that he 
found no powder residue or burns inside the Defendant's car 
evidencing any firing from inside the car. (Tr. 118). 
9 
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At the conclusion of this witness, the Defendant, out of 
the presence of jury, once more made a motion for directed 
verdict, which the Court denied. (Tr. 137). After said motion 
and out of the presence of the jury, the Court and all counsel 
reviewed the prepared instructions of the Court and at that 
time Defendant objected to said instructions and the failure 
of the Court to give Defendant's requested instructions, in-
cluding an instruction that there was not sufficient evidence 
to support the conviction of the offense charged, a necessary 
instruction on the intent necessary of the Defendant to be 
guilty of the offense, and the Defendant took due exception 
of the refusal to give said instructions. 
STATEMENT OF POINTS 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING OFFICER 
WARREN TO APPEAR BEFORE THE COURT OVER 
STRENUOUS OBJECTION OF DEFENDANT WHEN NO 
USEFUL PURPOSE WOULD BE SERVED AND PURPOSE 
WAS TO AROUSE SYMPATHY AND INFLAME JURY 
AGAINST DEFENDANT. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO DIRECT A 
VERDICT AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE STATE'S 
CASE; THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
PROVE DEFENDANT'S GUILT BEYOND A REASON-
ABLE DOUBT. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING DR. POWELL 
TO TESTIFY FOR "THE STATE AS TO THE CALIBER 
OF THE BULLET IN OFFICER WARREN'S HEAD. 
10 
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POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN FAILURE TO GIVE THE 
DEFENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTION NUMBERS 
2, 10, 11 AND 13. 
POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTION 
NUMBERS 6, 7, AND 12. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING OFFICER 
WARREN TO APPEAR BEFORE THE COURT OVER 
STRENUOUS OBJECTION OF DEFENDANT WHEN NO 
USEFUL PURPOSE WOULD BE SERVED AND PURPOSE 
WAS TO AROUSE SYMPATHY AND INFLAME JURY 
AGAINST DEFENDANT. 
In the testimony of Dr. Powell, witness for this State, 
the Dr. testified as to the size of the holes in the head of 
Officer Warren, the surgical procedures that he performed 
ana on page 42, li.ne 18 of the transcript, Dr. Powell testified 
"his wound has healed well." Dr. Powell further testified 
as follows: 
Tr. 43, line 23 : "Yes. he is unable to recollect any of 
the events when I ask him, and I would not expect 
him to have recollected the circumstances." 
Subsequent to this testimony, the State requested permis-
sion from the Court to bring in Officer Warren. After Of-
ficer Warren was before the Court, the District Attorney 
interrogated Dr. Powell as follows: 
Tr. 44, li.!1.e 9: 
11 
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Question: "Doctor, I have in the courtroom 
Trooper Warren. Could you explain to the jury 
and show them on his skull where the points of 
entry were?" 
Answer: "There is a large scar here, a curved 
scar, which is the surgical incision. This irregularity 
is where the bone was removed. And the two wounds 
are here on the right side of the forehead at this 
point (indicating). They have become quite pale, 
and you can barely see them. You can see them 
clearly enough here and here (indicating)." 
The above testimony was not essential in proving any 
controverted issue before the Court. The defense had not 
controverted the fact that there were two holes in the head 
of Officer Warren, the officer could not testify by reason of 
the traumatic spell of amnesia as the doctor had testified, 
and the bringing in of Officer Warren served no useful pur-
pose to assist the Court or the jury in determining facts 
already established, except for the purpose of inflaming the 
sympathy of the jury against the Defendant to see the pathetic 
officer in his wheelchair. Everyone present in the courtroom, 
including counsel, the Court, and the jury, could feel the 
emotions of everyone in the courtroom at the time and during 
the ·time Officer Warren was present in the courtroom. 
In Volume 2 of Wharton's Criminal Evidence, Page 631, 
states as follows : 
"It is permissible to exhibit to the jury scars 
and wounds on a person's body when a demonstration 
of this nature tends to solve any controverted issue 
in the case. When the character and extent of physi-
cal injury is in question, it is proper to produce the 
party and to illustrate the manner of receiving and 
the nature and extent of the wounds . . . ." 
"Scars may always be exhibited, it seems, as evi-
12 
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dence bearing upon an issue as to the seriousness of 
the woui:ds by. which the scars were produced, or the 
manner m which such wounds were inflicted. How-
~v~r,, such an exhibition should not be permitted if 
it is not relevant to an issue in the case, or if the 
scars are not shown to have resulted from the en-
com:iter which is the subject of the criminal charge, 
or if the scars are not entirely the result of the 
wounds inflicted by the acused, but are in part the 
result of a surgical operation." 
In the case of State of Montana vs. Cockrell, 309 P.2d 
316, the Montana Supreme Court ruled as follows: 
"Wounds received or scars left in commission 
of a crime are admissible if they tend to solve some 
controverted issue." 
In the case of State vs. Bischert, Montana, 308 P.2d 969, 
eited in State vs. Campbell, Montana, 405 P.2d 978, 22 ALR 
3rd 824, the Montana Court said as follows: 
"When the purpose of an exhibit is to inflame 
the minds of the jury or exci.te the feelings rather 
than to enlighten the jury as to any fact, it should be 
excluded." 
Such is the case before this Court, and this was, in fact, 
the effect of the bringing of Officer Warren into the court-
room. 
In Graves vs. State, Nevada, 1968, 439 P.2d 476, the 
Court said as follows : 
"Whether evidence of nature and extent of 
injury to victim of attempted murder is of such an 
inflammatory nature as to outweigh its probative 
value and preclude its admission is within sound 
discretion of the trial court." 
In the case of State vs. Jensen, Oregon, 296 P.2d 618. 
the Oregon Court held as follows: 
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"In a capital case, evidence which might shock 
jurors' sensibilities is not for that reason inadmis-
sible, but to bring into case wholly irrelevant evidence 
of gruesome character merely for purpose of exciting 
feelings of hate on part of jury against defendant 
would be indefensible and intolerable." 
In STATE vs. POE, 1969, 21 Utah 2d 113, 441 P 
2d 512, the Supreme Court of Utah was faced with the issue 
as to whether or not the Trial Court had used its discretion 
in admitting into evidence colored-slides made of victim during 
the course of autopsy and permitting them to be displayed to 
jury by means of slide projector and screen. The Court in 
reversing the judgment and remanding it for a new trial 
held as follows : 
"Initially, it is within the sound discretion of 
the Trial Court to determine whether the inflam-
matory nature of such slides is outweighed by their 
probative value with respect to a fact in issue. If 
the latter they may be admitted even though grue-
some. In the instant case they had no probative 
value. All the material facts which could conceivable 
have been adduced from a viewing of the slides had 
been established by uncontradicted lay and medical 
testimony. The only purpose served was to inflame 
and arouse the jury." 
The Utah Supreme Court cited OXENDINE vs. STATE, 
335 P 2d 940, Oklahoma and 73 ALR 2d 802 as authority 
for the above ruling. The OXENDINE vs. STATE OF OKLA-
HOMA case held as follows: 
"If princi.pal effect of demonstrative evidence 
such as photographs is to arouse the passion of the 
jury and inflame them against the defendant because 
of the horror of the crime, the evidence must be ex-
cluded, although, if the evidence has probative value 
with respect to a fact in issue that outweight the 
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danger of prejudice to the defendant, the evidence 
is admissible even if it is gruesome and may inci-
dentally arouse the passions of the jury." 
In the case before this Court there was not a controverted 
issue before the Court to be served by Officer Warren being 
brought into the court room. The pointing out of the surgical 
scar was not material to the issues of the case; there was no 
probative value in the testimony. There was no controverted 
issue in the case that the officer was shot, no controverted is-
sue that there were two holes in the officer's head nor size 
of the holes in Officer Warren's head. There was a contro-
verted issue as to the caliber of the bullet that struck the 
officer, but the bringing of Officer Warren into the Court 
room did not go to that issue and did not assist the Court 
nor the jury in determining that issue. The only purpose and 
affect of bringing Officer Warren into the court room was 
to inflame the minds of the jury or excite their feelings rather 
than to enlighten them as to any fact and this was the very 
real effect that was accomplished in the court room at that 
time. Defendant earnestly submits that the Trial Court abused 
its discretion in admitting Officer Warren into the court 
room when in fact, said appearance served no useful purpose. 
POINT II 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO DIRECT A 
VERDICT AT THE CONCLUSION OF THE STATE'S 
CASE; THERE WAS NOT SUFFICIENT EVIDENCE TO 
PROVE DEFENDANT'S GUILT BEYOND A REASON-
ABLE DOUBT. 
The State failed as a matter of law to prove beyond a 
reasonable doubt that the Defendant assaulted Officer War-
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ren with a revolver with the intent to commit murder. At 
the conclusion of the State's case, there was no evidence that 
the Defendant had shot and hit Officer Warren, there had 
been no gun identified for that purpose. One of the officer 
witnesses for the State testified he heard two shots pur-
portedly fired by Defendant, one immediately after another 
in rapid fire succession, and another officer witness of the 
State testifi€d that as he approached the scene there was only 
one shot fired. The physical facts are such that the .22 caliber 
pistol in evidence could not be fired rapid fire, was a single 
shot we3.pon th:>.t had to be cocked after each shot, and there 
is a very pronounced reasonable doubt as to the physical abil-
ity of anyone to fire the alleged .22 pistol under the distances 
and circumstances surrounding the facts of the case in the 
manner in which the State's witnesses testified. It is physi-
cally impossible for such a weapon to be fired as the State's 
witnesses testified. The facts are uncontroverted that Officer 
Warren was in direct line with the fire of Officer Duke. (See 
Exhibit XIII) that bullets were ricocheting around and about 
Defendant's car, that bullets had, in fact, split. There was 
no evidence, although the doctor had removed some of the 
bullet fragments from the head of Officer Warren, as to 
whether the fragments had come from the .22 caliber bullet 
or a .357 or .350 caliber pistol. There were no identifying 
fingerprints or marks upon the gun that was finally intro-
duced after the State had rested. The State's witnesses did 
not testify that they saw any gun in the hand of Defendant 
Wilks at any time during the shootings that took place. The 
State's witnesses, in the State's case, testified that Officer 
Warren had not drawn his gun and had fired no shots, when 
the physical evidence introduced in Defendant's case clearly 
showed that shots had been fired from the direction i.n which 
Officer Warren has been and into the back of Defendant's 
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car and through the windshield of Defendant's car which 
were not made by any caliber pistol the size that Defendant 
had had possession of. If you completely disregard the testi-
mony of the witnesses for the Defendant and just examine the 
physical evidence before the Court, as a matter of law there 
was not sufficient evidence beyond a reasonable doubt to 
prove the Defendant guilty of the offense charged. 
In the burden of proving a crime, the State has the burden 
of proving every essential element of the crime beyond a 
reasonable doubt. State vs. Hendricks, Utah, 1953, 258 P.2d 
453; State vs. Laris, Utah, 1931, 2 P.2d 243. In instruction 
(' 
No. 8, the Court instructed as to the elements of the crime as 
follows: 
Instruction No. 8 : 
"The material allegations of the crime of assault 
with intent to commit murder as charged in the in-
formation are as follows: 
1. That on or about the 2nd day of September, 1969, 
the Defendant made an assault on Charles War-
ren. 
2. That the assault, if any, was made with a loaded 
revolver which the Defendant held in his hand. 
3. That the assault, if any, was made without just 
cause or excuse and with intent to murder Charles 
Warren. 
4. That the Defendant then and there had the 
present ability to accomplish the death of Charles 
Warren." 
The evidence of the State and in the State's case did not 
produce any evidence to prove element No. 2 in the above 
instruction; the evidence of the State's case did not prove 
element No. 3 in the above instruction. There was no evidence 
in the State's case that the Defendant had a loaded revolver 
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in his hand except that shots were heard by Officer Duke. 
Officer Duke testified that he heard there were two shots, and 
Officer Rasmussen, approaching from the west, heard one 
shot. There is physical evidence in the photographs before 
the Court that there were at least two holes in the rear of the 
Defendant's car and at least one exiting through the wind-
shield that was made of a caliber bullet that the officers were 
using, and that was not in the possession of the Defendant. 
There is no evidence of a premeditated or intentional aiming 
of the gun in any manner with the necessary intent to murder. 
Even if you entirely disregard the witnesses for the defense, 
the physical evidence in the State's case do not carry the 
burden of proof necessary in a criminal matter, beyond a 
reasonable doubt, as required by law. 
POINT III 
THE COURT ERRED IN PERMITTING DR. POWELL 
TO TESTIFY AS TO THE CALIBER OF BULLET IN OF-
FICER WARREN'S HEAD. 
Dr; Powell testified on direct examination in part as fol-
lows: 
Tr. 38, line 9: 
"Question: Doctor, were you able to tell the size 
of the holes, these holes that you mentioned of entry?" 
Answer: Yes, the two holes were approximately 
14 of an inch in diameter. About %. of an inch apart, 
and they looked to me like they might have been made 
by a .32-size bullet. And I put that down on my emer-
gency room report, that they suggested a .32 caliber 
bullet, and I put a question mark, because I wasn't 
entirely sure." 
"Question: Are you familiar with the different 
sizes of bullets, .32, .22, .3, .357, etc.?" 
"Answer: Yes." 
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"Question: Do you have an opinion as to whether 
or not this size of hole-strike that. Have you, in your 
work, had occasion to examine other gunshot 
wounds?" 
"Answer: Many." 
"Question: And based upon your training and 
experience, do you have an opinion as to whether or 
not this hole could have been caused by a shell larger 
than a .32 ?" 
"Answer: Yes." 
"Question: What is your opinion?" 
"Answer: No, i.t could not have been. It could 
have been a .32 caliber bullet hole, but it was too small 
to be larger than a .32 caliber." 
"Question: Could it have been a .357 Magnum?" 
"Answer : No." 
"Question: Could it have been a .22 ?" 
"Answer: Yes, it might be." 
Tr. 44, line 20: 
"Question: Doctor, based on these two wounds, 
the shell fragment to the back of the skull, do you 
have an opinion as to how many bullets entered the 
skull?" 
"Answer: Yes." 
"Mr. Christensen: If your Honor please, we ob-
ject to his answering. He doesn't know where these 
were fired from, or how these were fired, or if there 
was a split slug, for instance. I think he could testify 
that there are two holes. There are probably two pro-
jectiles. But whether or not they were two separate 
bullets, I don't think he is confident and has enough 
knowledge to express his opinion, and we object to 
him so doing." 
"The Court: The objection will be overruled." 
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"Question: You may answer, doctor." 
"Answer : There were two wounds of entry 
which were identical. Both appeared to be bullet 
wounds of entry. One large fragment is still within 
the head, and is a bullet which has been altered by 
striking something, it is irregular. The other small 
fragments may or may not, may be fragments of this 
ont bullet, or could be fragments of a second bullet 
which exploded. There are three possibilities, and I 
couldn't di.ff erentiate between the two possibilities on 
the base of the medical evidence." 
"Question: Now you say the holes are similar. Do 
you mean the same size?" 
"Answer: The same size, the same appearance." 
"Question: And do you have an opinion, doctor, 
as to the caliber of the bullet that remains there, based 
upon its size from the X-ray." 
"Mr. Christensen: If Your Honor please, if he 
has got an opi.nion, he may answer yes or no." 
"Witness: It is my opinion that-
"Mr. Christensen: If Your Honor please, I object 
to his testifying. He has shown no foundation as to 
how he determined what the size is. There is nothing 
in the record to show any basis or any foundation for 
such an opinion. We object to it." 
"Mr. Maxfield: Your Honor, the doctor has tes-
tified that he is familiar with the different caliber 
weapons. He has seen manv bullet wounds of this 
type. We feel that he is qualified to tell the different 
calibers by the size. I think he is qualified to answer 
the question." 
"The Court: The objection is overruled, he may 
answer." 
"]\.fr. Christensen: May I make one observation, 
Your Honor?" 
"The Court: Yes, you may." 
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"Mr. Christensen: I further object on the 
grounds that there is no indication how the measure-
ments were made, from what basis he has made his 
calculation or determination, and I think there is no 
foundation laid." 
"The Court: The objection will be overruled, he 
may answer." 
"Mr. Maxfield: You may answer, doctor." 
"Answer: Judging from the appearance of the 
bullets still retained, this could be either a .22 deform-
ed, or a .32. But I aon't think it would be larger than 
a .32." 
Question : Were any fragments taken out or any 
portions of bullets large enough that the caliber of 
the bullets could be ascertained?" 
"Answer : No." 
"Mr. Maxfield: No further questions. Do we 
have any further need of Mr. Warren?" 
"By the Court: Do you have any further need, 
Mr. Christensen?" 
"Answer: No, Your Honor." 
"Question: Mr. Taylor?" 
"Answer: No, Your Honor." 
"The Court: Very Well, he may be taken out of 
the courtroom." 
Tr. 47- Cross-Examination, line 5: 
"Question: Dr. Powell, you, of course, have no 
knowledge as to how the projectiles got into the head, 
other than the fact that they were there, other than 
the eevidence that you have seen?" 
"Answer: That is correct." 
"Question: You say that the projectile is still 
there, you think it could be a .22 or possibly a .32. It 
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could be a fragment of a .357, could it not, as far as 
you know?" 
"Answer: That would be a remote possibility. It 
appears to be a somewhat deformed bullet of a smaller 
caliber." 
"Question: But isn't it true, doctor, that when 
a bullet strikes the skull very strange things happen 
to it?" 
"Answer: Correct." 
"Question: Distended, it may explode. A lot of 
things could transpire i.n respect to it?" 
"Answer: Correct." 
"Question: That would also be true, would it not, 
Doctor, if the bullet struck an object before it entered 
the head. It might break it in two or split it in two?" 
"Answer : Yes." 
"Question: So that it could, i.n fact, be one bullet 
that is split in two that made these two bullets?" 
"Answer: That would be a possibility." 
"Question: Is there any way of determining 
whether there is more than one bullet track through 
the brain, doctor?" 
"Answer: No." 
"Question: These X-rays from which you have 
testified, doctor, I take it were taken by you?" 
"Answer : They were taken by my order by the 
X-ray department." 
"Question: Were they taken with the specific 
thought in mind of measuring the size of the object 
that you located in the brain?" 
"Answer: They were taken with the object of 
learning what we could about the injury, and whether 
there were bullets in the head, and if so, where. 
Whether there was a facture, or any other detail we 
could determine." 
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"Question: But were they specifically taken to 
determine the size of the object as it actually is in the 
head?" 
"Answer: No." 
The above portion of the transcript is the evidence con-
cerning the alleged size of the piece of metal in Officer War-
ren' s head at the present time. The Court will note there has 
been no foundation laid for the doctor's ability to discern and 
determine the si.ze and caliber of bullets, other than the one 
question that he is familiar with sizes and has examined bullet 
wounds. The testimony of the doctor himself is such that the 
two holes in the head of Officer Warren could have been made 
by one bullet split in two. The evidence before the Court was 
that shots were being fired from Officer Duke's gun, a .357 
Magnum bullet, some of the shots being armor piercing am-
munition. Officer Warren was in the direct line of fire of Of-
ficer Duke. Defendant submits to the Court that there was not 
sufficient foundation laid by the State for Dr. Powell to testify 
as he did. 
POINT IV 
THE COURT ERRED IN REFUSING TO GIVE DE-
FENDANT'S REQUESTED INSTRUCTIONS NO. 2, 10, 
11, AND 13. 
Defendant's requested instruction No. 2 defines the words 
"unlawful and unlawfully", "deliberate", "premediate", "in-
tent", and "specific i.ntent". These terms and definitions are 
essential in instructing the jury as to the elements of the crime 
charged. These definitions are properly defined under the law. 
Defendant's requested instruction No. 10 is as follows: 
Instruction No. 10: 
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"Under the law of this State, every person who 
with intent to commit murder, commits an assault 
upon the person of another is guilty of assault with 
intent to commit murder. An assault is an unlawful 
attempt coupled with the present ability to commit 
a violent injury on the person of another. Before you 
can convict the Defendant, John Charles Wilks, of the 
crime of assault with intent to commit murder, you 
must believe from the evidence and beyond a reason-
able doubt that the State has established each and all 
of the following propositions: 
1. That on or about September 2, 1969, the Defend-
ant made an ass2.ult upon Charles 'Varren with a 
revolver in Utah County, State of Utah. 
2. That at the time of the making of such assault, 
the Defendant specifically intended to murder 
the said Charles Warren. 
3. That the Defendant then and there had the pres-
ent ability to accomplish the death of Charles 
Warren. 
If the State has failed to prove any one or more 
of the foregoing elements by evidence which convinces 
you beyond a reasonable doubt, then I charge you, 
members of the jury, that it is your duty to find the 
Defendant not guilty of the crime of assault with in-
tent to commit murder. 
If the State has proved to your satisfaction be-
yond a reasonable doubt each and all of the elements 
above mentioned and set out, then I charge you that 
the Defendant is guilty of assault with intent to com-
mit murder as is charged in the information." 
Defendant's requested instruction No. 11 is as fol-
lows: 
"If vou believe from the evidence that Def end-
ant, John Charlei;; Wilks. accidentallv, or unintention-
alhr fired or djR<>hartred a revolver in his hand and 
without a snecific intent to either aRsault or kill 
Charles Warren, then you are hereby directed to find 
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the Defendant not guilty of the offense charged in 
the information." 
Defendant's requested instruction No. 13 is as fol-
lows: 
"You are instructed that if from all the evidence 
you .find tha~ Defendant's gun accidentally or unin-
tentionally discharged and without a specific intent 
to murder or a specific intent to do great bodily harm, 
then you are directed to find the Defendant not 
guolty." 
The foregoing instructions requested by the Defendant 
but refused by the Court state with clarity the Defendant's 
theory and defense in this case. State of Utah vs. Gillian, 1970, 
23 Utah 2d 372, 463, P. 2d 811. It was the theory and he de-
fense of he Defendant in this case that the gun accidentally 
and unintentionally discharged ; that one of the chief and pri-
mary elements of the offense charged was that there had to 
be a specific intent in the mind of the Defendant to murder 
Officer Warren at the time of the discharge of the Defendant's 
gun. The circumstances of the Defendant, being surounded by 
two police cars, the fact the Defendant was being fired at by 
the officers, the physical evidence of the improbability of being 
able to accurately fire a single shot, non-automatic .22 caliber 
pistol all substantiate the Defendant's theory and defense in 
this matter. The failure to give the above instructions wiped 
out Defendant's theory of defense. 
76-30-1, U.C.A., 1953, defines murder as follows: 
"Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being 
with malice aforethought." 
76-30-2, U.C.A., 1953, defines "malice" as follows: 
"Such malice may be expressed or implied. It is 
expressed when there is manifested a deliberate in-
tention unlawfullv to take the life of a fellow crea-
ture. It is implied when no co11siderable provocatio:n 
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appears, or when the circumstances attending the 
killing show an abandoned and malignant heart." 
76-30-14, U.C.A., 1953, is the offense charged in the 
above case which is as follows: , 
"Assault with intent to murder. Every person 
who assaults another with intent to commit murder 
is punishable by imprisonment in the State Prison for 
a term of from five years to life." 
The Utah Supreme Court in the case of State vs. Minousis, 
228 Pac. 574, is a Utah case in which the defendant was charg-
ed with the crime of assault with intent to commit murder. 
The Court held as follows : 
"In order to convict one charged with assault 
with intent to commit murder, there must exist in 
mind of accused specific intent to take life of person 
assaulted." 
"Specific intent to take life of person assaulted 
may be proved by circumstantial as well as direct evi-
dence and may be inf erred by acts and conduct of 
accused, nature of weapon, and manner of its use, 
together with all other circumstances in the case." 
In the above case the facts were such that there was a 
prolonged period of time in which the guards of the mine in 
Carbon County and the workers had confronted each other 
during the day; that there were prolonged belligerent attitudes 
between the parties as well as uncomplimentary remarks ex-
changed between them; there was evidence of heated debate 
between the parties, a conduct of following the individual shot 
and direct evidence on the shooting itself, a witness having 
seen the gun in the hand of the defendant as it shot the person 
assaulted. The facts of the case before this Court do not sho-w 
any premeditation, conduct warranting deliberation, and the 
direct evidence that was in the Minousis case. 
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In the case of State vs. Buchanan, Idaho, 252 P. 2d 524, 
in a case involving assault with intent to commit murder, the 
Ida ho Court stated as follows: 
"Whether a specific intent to murder existed in 
mind of accused is a question of fact to be determined 
by jury from all the evidence and the inferences to be 
drawn therefrom, and it is not a matter of legal pre-
sumption." 
"Specific intent to kill is an essential ingredient of 
offense of assault with intent to murder, and such 
intent may generally be inferred from the unlawful 
use of deadlv weapon, PROVIDED IT WAS USED 
IN A WAY TO INDICATE INTENTION TO KILL." 
The instructions given by the Court did not require and 
define with clarity the specific intent in the mind of the De-
fendant necessary and as an essential element of the offense. 
The jury did not have an opportunity under the instructions 
given and the failure of the Court to give the requested in-
structions to determine whether or not there was a specific 
intent in the mind of the Defendant to ki.Il Officer Warren. 
Under the instructions given the jury did not have to find and 
did not determine whether there was a specific intent required. 
In the case of State of Utah vs. Peterson, 1969, 22 Utah 
2d 377, 453 P.2d, 696, the Court had before i.t the crime of 
assault with a deadly weapon with intent to do bodily harm. 
The Court there cites the above stated Minousis case. In the 
Peterson case the facts were such that there was dirct evidence 
that the defendant had a hunting knife in his hand, made a 
slashing motion toward the injured party and, in fact, cut the 
injured party. The Court found and ruled that the defendant 
is presumed to intend the natural and probable consequences 
of his acts, and that the acts were sufficient to prove the crime 
without proving the thoughts of the defendant at the time the 
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act occurred. In the case now before this Court there is not 
suffici.ent evidence to prove the premeditation and specific 
intent. There is not even direct evidence that the Defendant 
' in fact, hit and struck Officer Warren. Dr. Powell testified 
that the caliber of the bullet that struck Officer Warren was 
a .32 caliber, and this evidence was given without a sufficient 
basis or foundation to allow the testimony of Dr. Powell as to 
expertise on this ballistic testimony. 
POINT V 
THE COURT ERRED IN GIVING INSTRUCTIONS NO. 
6, 7, AND 12. 
A portion of the Court's instruction So. 6 is as follows: 
(b) "An assault with intent to commit murder is an 
unlawful attempt, coupled with an ability." 
The above instruction and the portion stated herein, is 
contrary to law i.n that it did not indicate to the jury that the 
Defendant must have had an intent to commit murder as an 
·element of he charge made against him. 
Defendant excepts to instruction No. 7 given by the Court 
which is as follows : 
"Murder is the unlawful killing of a human being, 
with malice, aforethought. 
The words malice or maliciously, as used in the fore-
going definition of murder and elsewhere in these 
instructions denote a wicked intention of the mind; 
an act done with a depraved mind and attended with 
circumstances which indicate a wilful disregard for 
the rights or sof ety of others. 
The word 'afterthought' means only that the intent 
must precede the act as distinguished from after-
thought. 'Afterthought' does not imply deliberation or 
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the lapse of considerable time. 
As used in connection with murder, 'malice' may be 
either expressed or implied. 
Malice is expressed when there is an intention unlaw-
fully to kill a human being. 
Malice is implied ( 1) when the killi.ng results from an 
act involving a high degree of probability that it will 
result in death, which act is intentionally done for a 
base, anti-social motive, and with wanton disregard 
for human life. 
The term 'malice' does not necessarily imply a pre-
existing hatred or enmity toward the person killed." 
The above instruction is contrary to law in that it erron.J 
eously makes reference to a killing, which is not an evidentiary 
fact in this case, in that no death occurred. This instruction 
is inappropriate for the charge made against the Defendant 
and distorts the instructions insofar as the necessary intent on 
the part of the Defendant, which is a matter of proof to be 
made by the State. 
Defendant excepts to instruction No. 12 given by the 
Court whi.ch is as follows : 
"The specific intent to commit murder may be proved 
by circumstantial as well as by direct evidence. Such 
intent may be inf erred from the acts and conduct of 
the Defendant, the nature of the weapon used and the 
manner of its use, all considered in connection wi.th 
the other circumstances present in the incident in 
question. 
A person is presumed to intend the natural and prob-
able consequences of his acts. However, this presump-
tion may be rebutted by evidence introduced at the 
trial." 
The above instruction unduly stresses circumstantial evi-
dence as permitting a finding of guilty wherein the Court fully 
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and adequately instructed the jury as to this matter in instruc-
tion No. 17. 
CONCLUSION 
In conclusion the Court committed prejudicial error in 
permitting the State to bring Officer Warren into the court 
room when no useful purpose wes served ; there was not a con-
troverted issue before the Court concerning Officer Warren 
which justified his appearance before the Court and when he 
could not and did not testify. The very real and dramatic af-
fect in the court room was to arouse sympathy for the officer 
and the State and inflame the jury against the Defendant and 
this inflamatory appearance in conjunction with the other er-
ror herein stated dramatically and prejudicially affected the 
jury. The State did not prove the necessary elements of the 
crime charged beyond a reasonable doubt and the Court erred 
in refusing to direct Defendant's motion for a directed verdict 
at the conclusion of the State's case; the State specifically 
failed to prove that the Defendant shot and hit Officer War-
ren. The facts and surrounding circumstances did not 
prove beyond a reasonable doubt the specific intent of the De-
fendant which was necessary as one of the elements of the 
crime beyond the necessary reasonable doubt standard. The 
Court prejudicially erred in permitting Doctor Powell to tes-
tify as to the caliber of the bullet in Officer Warren's head in 
that the Doctor admitted that the X-rays taken were not taken 
for the purpose of measuring the object, admitted that the 
bullets do split, explode and other unusual results when they 
hit a humari head; the State did not lay a sufficient foundation 
as a matter of law to permit the Doctor to testify as to the 
caliber of the object in the head of Officer Warren; the physi-
cal evidence itself substantiated the fact that the caliber of 
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bullet in Officer Warren's head was larger than the caliber of 
the pistol in the possession of the Defendant. Defendant's Re-
quested Instruction Numbers 2, 10, 11 and 13 were necessary 
and according to law with regard to the essential elements of 
the crime charged ; the said Requested Instructions described 
accurately Defendant's theory of the case and Defendant was 
prejudicially denied his lawful right to have his theory pre-
sented before the jury; the crime of assault with intent to com-
mit murder requires a specific intent to commit murder at the 
time of the discharge of Defendant's gun; the failure of the 
Court to gi.ve Defendant's Requested Instructions 2, 10, 11 and 
13 in conjunction with giving of the Court Instruction Num-
bers 6, 7 and 12 prejudiced the Defendant in the minds of the 
jury. The Court erred in giving the Court Instruction Numbers 
6, 7 and 12, they were contrary to law i.n that they did not 
indicate to the jury that the Defendant must have had a spe-
cific intent to commit murder and said instructions erroneous-
ly makes reference to a killing which is not evidencial fact in 
this case in that no death occurred; these said Instructions 
unduly stressed circumstantial evidence as permitting a fi.nd-
ing of guilty. Defendant respectfully submits to the Court that 
the above errors were prejudicial and directly influenced the 
jury adversely against the Defendant and that there certainly 
was a reasonable doubt as a matter of law. Consequently the 
verdict of the jury below and the judgment thereupon should 
be reversed. 
Respectfully submitted, 
Thomas S. Taylor 
for CHRISTENSEN, TAYLOR & MOODY 
Attorneys for Appellant 
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